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RATIONAL BASIS IS THE ONLY RATIONAL SOLUTION:
RESOLVING FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE CONFUSION
Justin Senior*
Abstract
Congress enacted the PROTECT Act in 2003 to curtail the sexual 
abuse of children by U.S. citizens abroad. While the Act has not received 
much attention from scholars or courts, defendants in court consistently 
challenge its constitutionality. Congress maintains that it has the Foreign 
Commerce Clause power to prohibit the illicit sex activity in question. 
However, the Foreign Commerce Clause, unlike its Interstate and Indian 
Commerce Clause brethren, has received very little attention. The 
Supreme Court has rarely—and not at all recently—discussed the Foreign 
Commerce Clause; and its lack of guidance in this arena has led to a 
recently widened circuit split regarding the constitutionality of the Act 
and the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause. 
Lower courts are at a loss for how to approach and analyze the Foreign 
Commerce Clause in the context of the Act. Some courts use the 
Interstate Commerce Clause framework; others create new language and 
establish their own tests. These approaches have overcomplicated 
analysis for the foreign context. While other scholars have discussed this
issue, they have generally contributed to the confusion by also creating 
new tests. This Note is the first endeavor to simplify the approach to 
Foreign Commerce Clause cases. It argues that courts should employ the 
age-old rational basis standard. This solution represents a commonsense 
approach and simplifies analysis for Foreign Commerce Clause cases in 
the future; additionally, it clears up the overcomplicated state of the 
jurisprudence created by the circuit split.
                                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am dedicating this 
Note to my dad, Bill, for showing me the value of “mental toughness” and teaching me how to 
read, write, and throw. I want to thank my mom, Pat, and my sister, Lexi, for their endless love, 
support, and positivity. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Sharon Rush for her 
mentorship as well as her invaluable thoughts and comments, without which this Note would have 
never made it to the finish line. Thank you to Bianca Manos, whose encouragement and 
companionship got me through all of law school, let alone this Note-writing process. Finally, I 
would like to thank the staff editors and members of the Florida Law Review, to whom I am 
forever indebted, not only for their diligent work on this Note and every other part of our 
publication, but also for their laughter, generosity, comfort, guidance, and friendship both in and 
out of the office.
1
Senior: Rational Basis Is The Only Rational Solution: Resolving Foreign C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
626 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................626 
I. COMMERCE CLAUSE BACKGROUND .......................................629 
A. Interstate Commerce Clause History .............................630 
B. Foreign Commerce Clause History................................632 
C. The Interstate Commerce Clause 
Analysis Cannot Be Superimposed
on Foreign Commerce Issues .........................................633 
II. THE PROTECT ACT ..............................................................633 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT.................................................................635 
A. Courts Blindly Superimposing
the Lopez Framework Without
Any Justification .............................................................636 
B. Courts Applying an Overbroad,
Constitutionally “Tenable Nexus” Test .........................637 
C. Courts Applying the Lopez Framework
Generally but Acknowledging its Potential
Inapplicability to Foreign Commerce
Clause Issues ..................................................................642 
D. New Developments in PROTECT 
Act Case Law..................................................................644 
IV. THE NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF § 2423(C) IS
CONSTITUTIONAL ...................................................................651 
V. RATIONAL BASIS: THE ONLY RATIONAL SOLUTION...............653 
CONCLUSION.........................................................................................655 
INTRODUCTION
Larry Michael Bollinger was an ordained Lutheran minister.1 In 2004, 
he moved to Haiti to oversee a large ministry at a religious center that 
served “hundreds of children.”2 He was also a sex addict.3 In 2009, 
Bollinger began molesting and sexually abusing young Haitian girls.4
After returning to the United States and admitting his sexual contact with 
young girls in Haiti to a psychologist, Bollinger remained “adamant” that
                                                                                                                     
1. United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 203 (4th Cir. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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he had not molested any children in the United States?most likely 
thinking he could disclose his illicit sex with children in Haiti because he 
“was beyond the reach of the law” in another country.5
A grand jury indicted Bollinger and charged the minister with two 
counts of engaging in illicit sex acts with minors after travelling in foreign 
commerce, thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) of the PROTECT Act.6
The PROTECT Act, or the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 
end the Exploitation of Children Today,7 aims, in relevant part, to “close 
significant loopholes in the law that persons who travel to foreign 
countries seeking sex with children are currently using to their advantage 
in order to avoid prosecution.”8 Specifically, § 2423(c) of the PROTECT 
Act gives Congress the power to punish U.S. citizens who travel in 
foreign commerce and then engage in an illicit sex act with anyone under 
the age of eighteen.9 Congress currently possesses the power to enact this 
statute through its Foreign Commerce Clause power.
The U.S. Constitution has three Commerce Clauses: Congress has the 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”10 While the U.S. Supreme 
Court has regularly examined the second clause—the Interstate 
Commerce Clause—always attempting to shape and define the scope of 
Congress’s power using past Commerce Clause jurisprudence to guide its 
decisions, the Court has yet to thoroughly explore the Foreign Commerce 
Clause (the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”).
Accordingly, the Interstate Commerce Clause has garnered major 
scholarly attention, while the Foreign Commerce Clause has only 
recently started to enter the scholarly domain.11 Although the Court has 
discussed the Foreign Commerce Clause,12 it has yet to grant certiorari to
this recent brand of Foreign Commerce Clause cases: those asking 
whether Congress has the extraterritorial power to punish U.S. citizens 
                                                                                                                     
5. Id. at 204.
6. Id.
7. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) 
(2012)).
8. H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 3 (2002).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2012).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See, e.g., Naomi Harlin Goodno, When the Commerce Clause Goes International: A 
Proposed Legal Framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1148 
(2013).
12. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (“[T]he 
Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with 
foreign governments.” (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))).
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who molest children in other countries.13 Congress currently possesses 
and exercises this power through the PROTECT Act.
Because the Supreme Court has not only avoided granting certiorari 
to cases discussing the PROTECT Act but has also failed to provide any 
guidance or establish any analytical framework for deciding Foreign 
Commerce Clause cases, lower courts have addressed and decided such 
cases with disparate methods.14 The Supreme Court’s limited discourse 
concerning the Foreign Commerce Clause marks the importance of 
“speak[ing] with one voice when regulating commercial relations with 
foreign governments.”15 However, the Court’s failure to establish a 
framework or test with which lower courts can decide foreign commerce 
cases with a unified voice has led to a recently widened circuit split.16
This lack of guidance, and subsequent lack of unity, creates an urgent 
need for an official, singular approach with which to decide Foreign 
Commerce Clause issues. Several excursions into Foreign Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence—such as Professor Naomi Harlin Goodno’s
Florida Law Review Article,17 to which this Note refers frequently—have 
dealt with this issue by examining the circuit split, but none have taken 
the newest case law into account; specifically, current scholarship has not
addressed a new standard created by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bollinger,18 which this Note analyzes
later to come to a conclusion about the current state of Foreign Commerce 
Clause case treatment.
This Note explores the current and confusing landscape of Foreign 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. While some lower courts have directly 
applied major elements of interstate commerce analysis to foreign 
commerce issues,19 other courts have established their own distinctive 
                                                                                                                     
13. See, e.g., United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 157 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
562 U.S. 1200 (2011); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1343 (2007).
14. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split on this issue).
15. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 285.
16. See infra Part III.
17. Goodno, supra note 11, at 1178–88 (demonstrating Foreign Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence in chart form).
18. 798 F.3d 201, 215–16 (4th Cir. 2015) (creating a new requirement that Congress can 
regulate any activity that demonstrably affects commerce).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 792–93 (6th Cir. 2015) (importing 
Interstate Commerce Clause analysis on the basis that Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause 
power might not be more expansive than its interstate power); United States v. Pendleton, 658 
F.3d 299, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying Interstate Commerce Clause analysis from the “time-
tested” Lopez framework); United States v. Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D.D.C. 
2012) (applying Interstate Commerce Clause analysis to the question of whether the Foreign 
Commerce Clause sanctioned the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act). 
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standards.20 Part I of this Note focuses on the innate differences between 
the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses by: (1) briefly discussing 
their individual backgrounds and (2) determining whether courts can (or 
should) use interstate analysis in the foreign context. Additionally, Part I 
concludes that the Foreign Commerce Clause might require its own
independent framework, as some other scholars suggest.21 Part II 
discusses both the legislative history and evolution of the PROTECT Act. 
Part III examines the recently-widened circuit split and the way the 
storied interstate jurisprudence has misinformed modern courts in their 
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis. Part IV argues that § 2423(c) is 
constitutional. Part V then suggests that courts use a rational basis 
approach rather than a new framework for analyzing foreign commerce 
issues.
I. COMMERCE CLAUSE BACKGROUND
Effectively answering whether interstate commerce analysis applies 
to foreign commerce issues requires a general understanding of the 
relevant history and background of Interstate Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. A struggle to balance federal and state power lies at the
heart of almost every Interstate Commerce Clause case;22 in such cases, 
the Supreme Court focuses on preserving state sovereignty.23 On the 
other hand, federalism does not constrain Congress’s foreign commerce 
                                                                                                                     
20. See, e.g., Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 215–16 (holding that “the Foreign Commerce Clause 
allows Congress to regulate activities that demonstrably affect such [foreign] commerce”); United 
States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that Congress has authority to 
legislate if the subject of a statute has a “constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign commerce”). 
21. See, e.g., Goodno, supra note 11, at 1152 (concluding that “the Foreign Commerce 
Clause needs its own distinct and comprehensive legal framework that reflects relevant history 
precedent, and text”).
22. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“We 
enforce the ‘outer limits’ of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority not for their own sake, but to 
protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby to 
maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist system of government.”); see also 
Goodno, supra note 11, at 1151 n.56 (“The history of the commerce clause adjudication is, in a 
very real sense, the history of federalism.” (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158 (8th ed. 2010))).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (“[T]he Framers’
carefully crafted [a] balance of power between the States and the National Government.”); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (“This case requires us to consider our place in the 
design of the Government and to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure 
of the Constitution.”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (“That 
distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the 
maintenance of our federal system.”).
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power.24 Where the framers, and subsequently the courts, emphasize the 
importance of differentiating national and local activities in the interstate 
context, this emphasis is absent in the foreign context, wherein the 
government need not address issues of state sovereignty. This major 
difference indicates that the interstate commerce analysis should not 
apply in the foreign context.
A. Interstate Commerce Clause History
The history of Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence reaches 
back almost two hundred years to seminal cases such as Gibbons v. 
Ogden.25 While modern courts employ a tri-category framework 
established in United States v. Lopez26 and do not frequently look back to 
older cases to support the essence of their analyses, this Note attempts to 
lay a concise foundation for a general understanding of how the interstate 
analysis evolved. 
In Gibbons, the Court provided the first judicial definition of 
commerce. Chief Justice John Marshall indicated that commerce 
included “intercourse and trade among the several States” as well as 
“navigation” in states.27 The Court has developed different views on what 
constitutes commerce and what Congress may regulate. Over one 
hundred years later, the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.28
held that Congress had the power to regulate activities that had a “close 
and substantial relation to interstate commerce.”29 Expressing concerns 
for federalism, this Court also warned that Congress must respect our dual
system of government.30 Shortly thereafter, the Court introduced the 
“aggregate effect” principle in Wickard v. Filburn.31 The Court held that 
Congress has the power to regulate local intrastate activities—in this case 
                                                                                                                     
24. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 n.13 (1979) (implying 
that neither federalism nor state sovereignty limit Congress’s power to regulate foreign 
commerce).
25. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
26. 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995); see infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
27. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 65.
28. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
29. Id. at 37.
30. Id. (“[T]he scope of [the interstate commerce power] must be considered in the light of 
our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate 
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would 
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a 
completely centralized government.”).
31. 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for 
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation 
where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far 
from trivial.”).
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the production of wheat for personal use—if they aggregately have a 
“substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce.32
Several cases echoed this language into the mid-1990s.33 In some 
cases, the Court expanded and clarified concepts such as “navigation,”
holding that Congress has the power to regulate the transportation of 
passengers as well as the “channels of interstate commerce.”34 Finally, in 
1995 the Court in Lopez established the analytical framework modern 
courts use in determining Interstate Commerce Clause issues.35 Building 
upon the concepts of intercourse, trade, and substantial effect, the Court 
created a tri-category framework: Congress may regulate (1) the use of 
the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, and (3) those activities that have a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce or that substantially affect interstate commerce.36
Courts have adopted this framework as the new standard, and it has 
ostensibly limited Congress’s Commerce Clause power. In United States 
v. Morrison,37 the Court noted that while violence against women did 
affect the national economy, this “noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct” did not—even in its aggregate—have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.38 This Court, along with the Court in Lopez,
expressed concerns for federalism, holding that regulating the activities 
in each case would constitute a national police power that ignores state 
sovereignty.39
The three categories the Court in Lopez set forth relate only to 
interstate commerce and omit any mention of foreign commerce.40
Furthermore, the Court not only in Lopez and Morrison but also in several 
of the other watershed cases mentioned above, explicitly articulates its 
                                                                                                                     
32. Id. at 125.
33. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (“[E]ven if appellee’s
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, 
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . . . .”
(quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125)).
34. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (“[T]he 
authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and 
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.” (quoting
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917))).
35. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
36. Id.
37. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38. Id. at 617.
39. See id. at 618; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
40. See Goodno, supra note 11, at 1162. For individual analysis of each of these three 
categories, see id. at 1156–58.
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concern for federalism and state sovereignty.41 How can courts apply this 
framework to foreign commerce cases, which U.S. case law indicates 
have no such concern with federalism and state sovereignty? 
Nonetheless, a host of courts apply this interstate framework in the 
foreign context.42
B.  Foreign Commerce Clause History
The Supreme Court’s Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence is far 
less extensive. While the Court has had many dynamic discussions 
concerning the Interstate Commerce Clause, it has rarely touched on 
foreign commerce issues.43 Despite this limited discourse, however, the 
Court has remained consistent on the Foreign Commerce Clause by 
indicating that federalism does not constrain its “exclusive and plenary”
power.44 Moreover, while the Court has yet to establish its own 
framework for such issues, it has indicated that Foreign Commerce 
Clause issues require “a more extensive constitutional inquiry” than 
Interstate Commerce Clause issues.45 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles46 provides a thorough summary of relevant Foreign Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence for the purposes of this Note.47
In Japan Line, the Court went one step further and expressly rejected 
the appellee’s argument that “the Commerce Clause analysis is identical, 
regardless of whether interstate or foreign commerce is involved.”48
Subsequently, rather than creating a new framework, the Court simply 
echoed its prior Foreign Commerce Clause cases and held that “the 
Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating 
commercial relations with foreign governments.”49
                                                                                                                     
41. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57 (1933) (insisting 
that “[t]he principle of duality in our system of government does not touch the authority of the 
Congress in the regulation of foreign commerce”).
42. See infra Section III.A.
43. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 (1979) 
(analyzing a foreign commerce issue); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) 
(discussing the federal government’s approach to foreign commerce cases); Bd. of Trs., 289 U.S. 
at 53 (examining the breadth of the Foreign Commerce Clause). 
44. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., 289 U.S. at 56–57 (“As an exclusive power, its exercise may not 
be limited, qualified or impeded to any extent by state action.”).
45. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446. 
46. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
47. See id. at 448–49.
48. Id. at 446.
49. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1976)) (“The 
need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in ascertaining the negative implications of 
Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations’ under the Commerce Clause.”).
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C.  The Interstate Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be
Superimposed on Foreign Commerce Issues
This review of fundamental Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence indicates that the modern tri-category framework used for 
analyzing Interstate Commerce Clause issues does not—and should 
not—apply to Foreign Commerce Clause issues. While the Court 
developed the Interstate Commerce Clause framework with state 
sovereignty and federalism concerns in mind, it does not take such 
concerns into account while deciding foreign commerce issues. 
Additionally, not only has the Court indicated that the Interstate 
framework does not fit in the foreign context,50 but it has also indicated 
that the Founders intended for Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause 
power to exceed its Interstate Commerce Clause power.51 If Congress has 
more power to regulate commerce “with foreign nations” than it does 
“among the several states,” and federalism and state sovereignty concerns 
do not inhibit its power to regulate foreign commerce, then it stands to 
reason that courts should not apply the tri-category framework for 
Interstate Commerce Clause issues from Lopez to Foreign Commerce 
Clause questions. This framework is unduly demanding in the foreign
context. Part III’s discussion of the modern circuit split further supports
this argument. However, a discussion of the PROTECT Act must precede 
any discussion of the circuit split.
II. THE PROTECT ACT
Formerly known as the “Sex Tourism Prohibition Improvement Act 
of 2002,”52 the PROTECT Act (§ 2423) provides for the prosecution of 
U.S. citizens who molest children abroad.53 Adapted and expanded from 
a brief statute originally regarding only the transportation of minors with 
the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity,54 § 2423 has undergone 
consistent and substantial changes. In 1994, the legislature implemented 
one of the first big changes by creating two vague subsections.55 The first 
subsection criminalized the knowing transportation of minors with the 
                                                                                                                     
50. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
51. See id. at 448; see also Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional 
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 475 (1941) (“Despite the 
formal parallelism of the grants, there is no tenable reason for believing that anywhere nearly so 
large a range of action was given over commerce ‘among the several states’ as over that ‘with 
foreign nations.’”).
52. H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 1 (2002).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (1988).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (1994).
9
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“intent to engage in criminal sexual activity.”56 Also focused on intent, 
the second subsection pertained to U.S. citizens’ travel in either interstate 
or foreign commerce “for the purpose of engaging in any sexual 
act . . . with a person under 18 years of age.”57 Furthermore, both of these 
subsections provided that anyone prosecuted under this statute “shall be 
fined” or “imprisoned not more than 15 years.”58 This is an increased 
sentence from the original version of the statute’s requirement of “not 
more than 10 years.”59 Additionally, Congress added to the first 
subsection that the criminal offender did not have to succeed in 
transporting a minor or engaging in a criminal sexual act, but only had to 
“attempt[] to do so.”60
Between 2000 and 2012, Congress continued to both expand and
clarify the statute. The biggest change, however, came in 2006. Congress 
added five new subsections, which not only included new punishable 
conduct and definitions that added clarity to the statute, but also doubled 
the term of imprisonment to “not more than 30 years.”61
This Note focuses on one of these new subsections, § 2423(c), which 
removes the intent requirement from subsection (b) and attempts to 
criminalize “[a]ny United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent 
residence who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either temporarily 
or permanently, in a foreign country, and engages in any illicit sexual 
conduct with another person.”62 Congress enacted this legislation to 
remove the intent requirement simply because “proving intent in such 
cases is extremely difficult.”63 The legislature wanted to expand the Act 
so that it could punish any “individuals who travel to foreign countries 
and engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor regardless of where the 
intent to do so was formed.”64 This removal of intent changes the 
behavior that Congress regulates. In § 2423(b), Congress regulated the 
channels of commerce consistent with its ability to keep them “free from 
immoral and injurious uses.”65 Conversely, in § 2423(c), Congress does 
not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of commerce; Congress 
simply regulates any individual who travels abroad and then engages in 
illicit sex acts. This distinction presents an issue because it calls into 
                                                                                                                     
56. Id. § 2423(a).
57. Id. § 2423(b).
58. Id. § 2423(a)–(b).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (1988).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (1994).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2012).
63. 148 CONG. REC. H3886 (daily ed. June 25, 2002).
64. 148 CONG. REC. H3885 (daily ed. June 25, 2002).
65. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (quoting
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)).
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question whether Congress is actually regulating commerce. As a result, 
many defendants have challenged the constitutionality of this federal 
statute.66
Congress added definitions that detail what constitutes “illicit sexual 
conduct” under § 2423.67 Essentially, Congress has defined two types of 
illicit sex acts: commercial68 and noncommercial.69 Subsection 
1591(c)(1) of the same Title defines a commercial sex act as “any sex act, 
on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any 
person.”70 This definition simplifies “sex act” and essentially equates it 
with a transaction. While it might make sense for Congress to have the 
Foreign Commerce Clause power to regulate commercial sex acts 
following foreign travel, Congress’s ability to regulate noncommercial 
illicit sex acts abroad is less certain. Congress uses travelling to a foreign 
nation as its only hook into commerce, and some scholars mock this as a 
flimsy relation.71
The many legislative changes, including increasing the term of 
imprisonment, the several clarifications, and the removal of intent, all 
speak to Congress’s intent to broaden the scope of what it can criminalize. 
However, the courts have been unable to find “one voice” with which to 
decide whether the long arm of Congress has extended too far, as the 
following discussion of the circuit split indicates.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Several courts have struggled with analyzing the bounds of 
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power. Professor Goodno’s article 
sorts these courts and their varying approaches into three distinct 
categories: (1) courts “[m]echanically applying the Lopez framework 
without explanation”; (2) courts “[a]dopting a new ‘tenable nexus’ test”;
and (3) courts applying the Lopez framework but recognizing that
Congress has “broader power to regulate foreign commerce.”72 While this 
Part will similarly discuss these three categories, it will also discuss and 
expand on two new approaches that courts have established since the 
                                                                                                                     
66. See, e.g., United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 207 (4th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 204 (2015); United States 
v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 161–
62 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 207–08 (5th Cir. 2003).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f).
68. Id. § 2423(f)(2).
69. Id. § 2423(f)(1).
70. Id. § 1591(e)(3).
71. See, e.g., Goodno, supra note 11, at 1141 (asking whether Congress can regulate a U.S. 
citizen “littering in France” or “prohibit a U.S. citizen from eating pasta in Italy”).
72. Id. at 1178.
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publication of Professor Goodno’s article. First, the court in United States
v. Al-Maliki73 held that no part of the Lopez framework applies to § 
2423(c).74 Second, and most recently, the court in United States v. 
Bollinger75 created a new standard: the Foreign Commerce Clause allows
Congress to “regulate activities that demonstrably affect such
commerce.”76
A. Courts Blindly Superimposing the Lopez Framework Without 
Any Justification
In 2011, the district court in United States v. Schneider77 convicted a 
U.S. citizen under subsection (b) of the PROTECT Act.78 Schneider 
traveled to Russia with the intent to engage in noncommercial illicit sex 
with a young boy, Zavarov.79 When Schneider challenged the 
constitutionality of § 2423(b), the district court directly imported the first 
category of the Lopez framework and maintained it was a proper 
regulation of the channels of commerce.80 This court gave no reason for 
applying interstate commerce analysis; it simply decided to follow the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which rejected a similar 
claim of unconstitutionality without any reasoning.81
This mechanical application of the interstate commerce framework—
without reasoning or explanation—does not make sense. This court, as 
well as several others that mechanically apply the interstate framework 
in deciding other foreign commerce issues,82 ignores the essential 
Supreme Court precedent indicating that interstate and foreign commerce 
                                                                                                                     
73. 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 204 (2015).
74. See id. at 792–93.
75. 798 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2015).
76. Id. at 215–16.
77. 817 F. Supp. 2d 586 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
78. Id. at 601–02.
79. Id. at 590.
80. Id. at 602. For another example of a case in which the constitutionality of § 2423(b) was 
upheld, see United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 208 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality 
of § 2423(b) on the grounds that “a court should allow Congress greater deference in regulating 
the channels of foreign commerce”).
81. See Schneider, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (citing United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 
470 (3d Cir. 2006)) (disagreeing with the contention that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause 
power by simply quoting the tri-category framework from United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
558–59 (1995)).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(applying the tri-category framework from Lopez mechanically to the International Parental 
Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA), which criminalizes the removal of “a child from the United 
States . . . with [the] intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights”).
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require different analyses.83 Moreover, superimposing the interstate 
commerce analysis on a foreign commerce issue without any explanation 
of why the framework does—or should—apply overlooks the reality that 
the Supreme Court referred only to interstate commerce in each of the 
three categories from Lopez84 and never “explicitly or implicitly stated 
that the Lopez Interstate Commerce Clause framework (or the negative 
implications of it) should apply to the Foreign Commerce Clause.”85
B.  Courts Applying an Overbroad, Constitutionally 
“Tenable Nexus” Test
In 2006, for the first time, a court recognized that perhaps the Lopez
framework did not guide the analysis for a challenge of the PROTECT 
Act’s constitutionality, in the case of United States v. Clark.86 In this case, 
the court examined the “commercial sex act” prong of § 2423(c).87 The 
defendant in this case, Michael Lewis Clark, resided primarily in 
Cambodia but retained his U.S. citizenship and made annual trips back to 
the United States.88 While in Cambodia, Clark “routinely payed” about 
two dollars to each boy he molested.89 Clark’s payment brings his 
conduct under the commercial prong of the statute. 
This court recognized its unique situation90 and explicitly rejected the 
tri-category framework from Lopez, citing Lopez, Jones & Laughlin 
Steel, and Japan Line as precedent.91 Observing that the Lopez framework 
“developed in response to the unique federalism concerns that define 
congressional authority in the interstate context” and that “[t]he scope of 
the interstate commerce power ‘must be considered in the light of our 
dual system of government,’” the court indicated that “no analogous 
framework exists for foreign commerce.”92 The court further identified 
“evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce 
                                                                                                                     
83. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979) (holding that 
foreign commerce analysis requires “a more extensive constitutional inquiry”).
84. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
85. Goodno, supra note 11, at 1181.
86. 435 F.3d 1100, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2006).
87. Id. at 1105.
88. Id. at 1103.
89. Id. at 1104. 
90. See id. at 1102 (admitting that “[i]t is not so much that the contours of the Foreign 
Commerce Clause are crystal clear, but rather that their scope has yet to be subjected to judicial 
scrutiny”).
91. Id. at 1103 (“Instead of slavishly marching down the path of grafting the interstate 
commerce framework onto foreign commerce, we step back and take a global, commonsense 
approach to the circumstance presented here . . . .”).
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
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power to be the greater” as compared with interstate commerce.93 In its 
rejection of the Lopez framework, the court ultimately noted that while 
using interstate commerce analysis for foreign commerce issues “is not 
an insurmountable task” depending on the context, it can “feel like 
jamming a square peg into a round hole.”94
To support its conclusion that the Lopez framework does not apply to 
foreign commerce cases, the court indicated that the Supreme Court has 
defined Congress’s authority “under the Indian Commerce Clause 
without reference to the rigid categories of Lopez.”95 Combined with the 
absence of “federal/state interplay seen in the Interstate Commerce 
Clause cases,” this encouraged the court to adopt a new test: whether the 
regulated activity has a “constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign 
commerce.”96
This test bears a striking resemblance to a traditional rational basis 
approach. In fact, it seems like it accomplishes the same result. The court 
clarifies the goal of the test by simplifying its objective: determining 
whether the statute has “a rational relationship to Congress’s authority 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause.”97 This is rational basis language. 
Knowing that it should not apply the Lopez framework, the court 
concluded that it should “view the Foreign Commerce Clause 
independently from its domestic brethren”98 and held that the 
combination of foreign travel with “a commercial transaction while 
abroad implicate[d] foreign commerce to a constitutionally adequate 
degree.”99 In an effort to develop a new test, the court simply used a 
rational basis standard but did so by creating new language. 
The court suggested that foreign travel “trigger[s]” the statute, and the 
subsequent commercial sex act creates a “constitutionally tenable 
nexus.”100 However, the court then contrasts the “economic character” of 
a commercial sex act with activities that the noncommercial prong of 
§ 2423(c) attempts to regulate, by analogizing to Lopez and Morrison. In
both of those cases, the Supreme Court “voiced strong concerns over 
Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause to enact ‘a criminal statute that 
by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.’”101
                                                                                                                     
93. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979).
94. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103.
95. Id. at 1113.
96. Id. at 1114.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1116.
99. Id. at 1114.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1115 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)).
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Accordingly, the court cited its duty of constitutional avoidance and 
limited its holding to § 2423(c)’s “regulation of commercial sex acts.”102
The tenable nexus test, which the court fails to define or explain, 
appears to have few limitations, if any. The term “tenable” denotes that 
while perhaps the relationship to commerce can be argued—or defended 
against argument—it need not be proven or concretely articulated. This 
test then essentially allows courts to uphold legislation if there is a
rational basis for concluding that the legislation encompasses activity that
might hypothetically affect commerce with a foreign nation. This is a 
rational basis standard under a different name. 
In United States v. Bianchi,103 the Third Circuit adopted the Clark
court’s reasoning to uphold the constitutionality of both the commercial 
and noncommercial prongs of § 2423(c) without explanation.104 The 
Bianchi court simply found the Clark court’s “reasoning persuasive.”105
However, the Clark court’s holding lacks sound reasoning. Immediately 
after asking the question of “whether the statute bears a rational 
relationship to Congress’s authority under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause,” the court pointed out only that the defendant did travel in foreign 
commerce, and then engaged in an illicit sex act, and the defendant’s
combined actions sufficiently implicated foreign commerce to a 
“constitutionally adequate degree.”106 The court did not explain why or 
how the combination of these actions have a rational relationship to 
foreign commerce, only that they met the statute’s requirements. 
Therefore, the Bianchi court’s acceptance of the Clark court’s
“reasoning” is perplexing. While the Bianchi court did not use the 
“tenable nexus” language, it followed Clark’s rational relationship 
language.107
Additionally, the Bianchi court attempted to further support its 
position by emphasizing that the Supreme Court has “never struck down 
a law as exceeding Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause powers.”108
While Congress does have broader power regarding foreign commerce, 
it “has never been deemed unlimited.”109 Additionally, the court failed to 
recognize that the Supreme Court has scrutinized only a select few cases 
regarding Foreign Commerce Clause issues,110 and the preeminent Japan 
                                                                                                                     
102. Id. at 1110.
103. 386 F. App’x 156 (3d Cir. 2010).
104. Id. at 161–62.
105. Id. at 161.
106. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1114.
107. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x at 164.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 163 (Roth, J., dissenting).
110. See cases cited supra note 13.
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Line case from over thirty years ago dealt exclusively with a purely 
economic activity.111 The court, again, tried to support its position by 
claiming that “[t]he Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Foreign 
Commerce Clause applies with equal force to the non-commercial sexual 
conduct prong of § 2423(c) . . . .”112 However, the court refuses to explain 
why it should apply with equal force, despite the illogical nature of the 
assertion. A contention that Congress’s power to regulate commerce 
applies equally to commercial as well as noncommercial activity does not 
carry much weight without any explanation as to why, considering that 
noncommercial illicit sexual conduct “does not in any sense of the phrase 
relate to commerce with foreign nations.”113 The proper rationale for this 
situation is that not regulating the noncommercial activity could have an 
effect on commercial child sex tourism.114
The “tenable nexus” test presents significant issues, and the Clark and 
Bianchi courts generally fail to explain their reasoning in applying this 
test. It presents an issue because while it should have the same application 
and effect as a simple rational basis standard, it might take on a different 
meaning since the Clark court never defined it. In a sense, the tenable 
nexus test could fail to recognize any limit and might indeed create a 
“slippery slope” for future Congressional enactments with extraterritorial 
reach. If it has the same intended application as a rational basis standard 
but has a different name, courts might attribute additional power to it and 
potentially use it to prohibit activities otherwise outside of Congress’s
power; anything less than a rational basis standard is, by definition, 
irrational. Moreover, this test might fail to comply with the Supreme 
Court’s assertion that the Commerce Clause is “subject to outer limits.”115
According to the cases in which this test is used, Congress can regulate 
an activity with a bare economic component—or an activity with no 
economic component—as long as the activity occurs “subsequent to 
some form of international travel.”116 But courts can more appropriately 
arrive at the same end result by adopting a rational basis standard and by 
examining the illicit sexual conduct and the ways it could affect 
commerce, rather than focusing on the travel.
                                                                                                                     
111. See generally Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) 
(examining a Foreign Commerce Clause issue concerning a Japanese shipping company’s cargo 
that was used exclusively in foreign commerce but was subjected to double taxation by both Japan 
and property taxes from appellees in California).
112. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x at 162.
113. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
114. See infra Part IV. 
115. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995).
116. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1117.
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International travel is ostensibly the only hook into foreign commerce, 
but the statute does not punish the travel in or the immoral use of the 
channels of foreign commerce. In the case of the noncommercial prong 
of § 2423(c), the statute punishes some future conduct “entirely divorced 
from the act of traveling except for the fact that the travel occurs at some 
point prior to the regulated conduct.”117 Furthermore, neither the statute 
nor any court has identified a timeframe during which an illicit sex act 
must occur after the foreign travel. 
Without a temporal link, can Congress regulate the noncommercial 
activity of a defendant ten years after the foreign travel takes place? 
Indeed, the dissenting judge in Bianchi takes issue with this inadequacy, 
finding “no rational basis to conclude that an illicit sex act with a minor 
undertaken on foreign soil, perhaps years after legal travel and devoid of 
any exchange of value, substantially affects foreign commerce.”118 But 
considering Congress’s broader power in the foreign arena, courts should 
not have to find a substantial effect, but only a rational basis to conclude 
that the conduct could have some effect on commerce, especially in its 
aggregate. 
Much like the dissenting judge in Bianchi, the dissenting judge in 
Clark argued that because travel in foreign commerce can put a 
noncommercial activity within the province of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause power, then Congress can regulate every act that occurs after the 
travel.119 One might argue that this type of regulation no longer represents 
commerce power, but police power. However, if the noncommercial 
activity could have an effect on commerce, much like possessing small 
amounts of marijuana in Gonzalez v. Raich,120 in which the court held 
that the noncommercial activity at hand could affect interstate 
commerce,121 then why should Congress not be able to regulate the 
conduct in question?
Other courts have noted the shortcomings of the tenable nexus test. 
But would they perceive any shortcomings if the test was simply rational
basis? Such a critique would be dubious, considering the unambiguous 
and well-established applications of the rational basis test in a myriad of 
                                                                                                                     
117. Id. at 1119.
118. United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2010) (Roth, J., dissenting).
119. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1120–21 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). But this argument does not 
hold water. Congress cannot punish a U.S. citizen for travelling to Paris and giving the jacket on 
her back to a homeless person; no court would have a rational basis to conclude that such conduct 
would have any type of effect on commerce or a larger regulatory scheme. The contention that 
Congress could criminalize any conduct subsequent to foreign travel does not follow; Congress 
can, however, criminalize a noneconomic activity that could have an effect on commerce. See 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
120. 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
121. Id. at 2 (“[T]he regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power . . . .”).
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past cases. In any case, these courts have decided to apply the Lopez 
framework generally—much like the dissenters in Clark and Bianchi—
but have also admitted that Congress has broader power under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause than the Interstate Commerce Clause.122
While sticking to the Lopez framework represents an effort at 
constitutional avoidance, the admission of the differentiation in scopes of 
power indicates that the courts know the Lopez framework does not quite 
suffice, but they use it as the best current option.
C.  Courts Applying the Lopez Framework Generally but 
Acknowledging its Potential Inapplicability to 
Foreign Commerce Clause Issues
This category of courts finds itself somewhere in between the first and 
second categories. Like the courts in the first category, courts in this 
category inappropriately apply Lopez. However, they recognize the 
shortcomings of doing so. Similar to courts in the second category, courts 
in this third category recognize that perhaps the Lopez framework should 
not apply—given Congress’s broader Foreign Commerce Clause power 
and lack of state sovereignty and federalism concerns—but use it as a 
tried-and-true method rather than creating new tests or adopting the 
tenable nexus test without explanations. Also, this category contains a 
case from the Third Circuit, United States v. Pendleton,123 that directly 
opposes the Third Circuit’s holding in Bianchi.
Six months after travelling from New York to Germany, Pendleton 
molested a fifteen-year-old boy.124 Pendleton challenged the 
constitutionality of the noncommercial prong,125 and the Third Circuit 
rejected his argument.126 Although the court admits that the Lopez 
framework was developed to “[a]ddress unique federalism concerns that 
are absent in foreign commerce,” it applied the framework based on 
“hesitan[ce]” to deviate from “Lopez’s ‘time-tested’ framework without 
further guidance from the Supreme Court.”127 This signals a crucial need 
for Supreme Court guidance.
The Pendleton court misinterprets the issue at hand: rather than 
deciding if Congress can regulate the noncommercial activity in question,
the court focused on why Congress enacted the statute in the first place. 
                                                                                                                     
122. See, e.g., United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
123. 658 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2011).
124. Id. at 301.
125. Id. at 302.
126. Id. at 311. 
127. Id. at 308 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 
1119 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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The court acknowledged that Congress enacted § 2423(c) to “close 
significant loopholes in the law that persons who travel to foreign 
countries seeking sex with children are currently using to their advantage 
in order to avoid prosecution”128 and then supported this legislative intent 
with the fact that prosecutors “were having an ‘extremely difficult’ time 
‘proving intent in such cases.’”129 The court then used this legislative 
intent to support why § 2423(c) is constitutional when the legislative 
intent only gives reasoning for why § 2423(c) was enacted. Based on this 
misreading, the court suggested that “Congress enacted § 2423(c) to 
regulate persons who use the channels of commerce to circumvent local 
laws that criminalize child abuse and molestation.”130 However, this 
language implies that the court thought § 2423(c) punishes individuals 
who travel with the intent to engage in illicit sex acts with children. But 
§ 2423(b) encompasses this behavior, not § 2423(c). Congress enacted 
§ 2423(c) to regulate persons who use the channels of commerce to travel 
and then at some time afterwards to engage in an illicit sex act with a 
minor, regardless of whether they travelled with the intent to do so.
The court then repeated its misreading of the statute by claiming that 
Congress may “attempt to prevent sex tourists from using the channels of 
foreign commerce to abuse children.”131 But that issue is not disputed in 
this case, as this case dealt with—or should have dealt with—§ 2423(c), 
not (b). This court failed to answer the pivotal question of whether 
Congress can punish a U.S. citizen for travelling in the channels of 
commerce without intent and then later engaging in an illicit sex act with 
a minor. In similar fashion, several cases that followed this opinion base 
their holdings accordingly. For example, in United States v. Bey,132 the 
court simply concluded that the defendant’s challenge of § 2423(c)’s
constitutionality was meritless and based this conclusion solely on 
Pendleton’s holding that § 2423(c) “was a valid exercise of Congress’s
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause.”133
Additionally, the court in United States v. Flath134 followed the 
Pendleton court in applying the tri-category Lopez framework while 
recognizing its limits.135 The court admitted that no analogous framework 
exists for determining whether Congress can regulate a specific activity 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause, yet found the Lopez framework “to 
                                                                                                                     
128. Id. at 310 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 3 (2002)).
129. Id. (quoting 148 CONG. REC. 3886 (2002)).
130. Id. at 311.
131. Id.
132. No. 10-164-01, 2014 WL 7465663 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2014).
133. Id. at *15.
134. 845 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
135. See id. at 955. 
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be an appropriate starting point” anyhow, despite the “significant 
distinctions between the interstate and foreign commerce powers.”136
Notwithstanding the defendant’s argument,137 which the court conceded
was “not without merit,” the court felt “constrained to follow” the 
decisions of other courts in upholding the constitutionality of § 2423(c),
including the Pendleton court.138
Yet again, it seems that another court—through the confusion that has 
resulted from a lack of Supreme Court guidance—has decided to follow 
the Pendleton court’s misinterpretation of the relevant issues at hand. In 
more recent cases, some courts have taken different approaches. 
D. New Developments in PROTECT Act Case Law
Courts have decided only a few cases pertinent to this issue since 
Bianchi and Pendleton. One such case is United States v. Al-Maliki.139
While Al-Maliki does not fit neatly into any of the three categories 
discussed above, it discusses Lopez and represents a line of reasoning 
disparate from the courts in the split. In this case, Al-Maliki was charged 
under the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c).140 The defendant 
challenged § 2423(c)’s constitutionality,141 and like several of the courts 
discussed in this Note—such as Clark¸ in which the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit practiced its duty of constitutional 
avoidance142—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit resolved 
                                                                                                                     
136. Id. 
137. The defendant in the Flath case urged the court to adopt the reasoning of dissenting 
Judge Manion in United States v. Vasquez. Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 
325, 333 (7th Cir. 2012) (Manion, J., dissenting)). The dissent noted that courts “traditionally 
uphold Congress’s power to regulate movement across state lines with an illicit purpose, not 
movement across state lines with an innocent purpose, followed at some later time by criminal 
conduct that is disconnected temporally from the travel.” Vasquez, 611 F.3d at 333. This reasoning 
indicates that § 2423(b), which contained the intent requirement, was clearly within Congress’s 
power to enact, whereas § 2423(c)’s constitutionality is less certain. Echoing the dissent from 
Bianchi discussed above, Judge Manion emphasized that “[a] person’s mere travel across state 
lines does not give Congress authority to later regulate all of his future conduct.” Id. at 335. But 
it appears that Judge Manion focused on the wrong issue; the issue is not whether a person’s travel 
gives congress the authority to regulate action, but whether the action affects commerce. 
Certainly, the travel is a commercial act. But if an action—whether commercial or 
noncommercial—affects or could affect foreign commerce to some degree, then Congress should 
have the Foreign Commerce Clause power to regulate that action.
138. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 956.
139. United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 204 
(2015).
140. Id. at 789.
141. Id. at 790.
142. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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that it “need not finally decide” the issue.143 However, the court did not 
make that determination for the same reason as the Clark court; in fact, 
the court concluded that it did not need to make a decision because it had 
to review the constitutional challenge under plain-error review in 
accordance with Rule 52(b), after the plaintiff forfeited his challenge by 
failing to raise it below.144
The court simply equated the question of whether there was any error 
“that was obvious or clear” to the question of whether the statute is 
unconstitutional.145 Because any determination of this statute’s
constitutionality is far from obvious or clear, the court correspondingly 
had to affirm the holding of the lower court that the statute was 
constitutional.146 Nonetheless, the court suggests that it “doubt[ed]” that 
the Commerce Clause includes “the power to punish a citizen’s
noncommercial conduct while the citizen resides in a foreign nation.”147
Most courts have not come to the same conclusion.148
Initially, the court discussed the definition of commerce under the 
original meaning of the Constitution.149 As originally understood, this 
court suggested, the Foreign Commerce Clause gave Congress the 
“power to regulate trade or intercourse with foreign countries.”150
Furthermore, the original meaning does not allow for Congress to 
“criminalize a citizen’s noncommercial activity in a foreign country,” as 
that does not fall under the definition of “commerce.”151 That being said, 
the court indicated that in the interstate context, the Supreme Court has 
departed from this original definition, and the Lopez framework acts as 
the modern definition of commerce.152
The court discusses the Lopez framework, but only to indicate that 
even if Lopez were applicable in the Foreign Commerce Clause context, 
§ 2423(c) does not meet any of its three criteria.153 Neither the “channels”
nor “instrumentalities” categories fit § 2423(c), as § 2423(b) covers the 
criminalization of “traveling in the channels of commerce for the purpose
of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor.”154 Finally, the third 
                                                                                                                     
143. Id. at 792.
144. Id. at 791.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 791–92.
147. Id. at 791.
148. See supra Sections III.A–.C.
149. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 792.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)).
153. Id. at 792–93. 
154. Id. at 792 (emphasis added). The court also indicates that § 2423(a) involves the 
instrumentalities category, but that exceeds the scope of this Note.
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category, substantial effect, does not apply either.155 According to the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, Congress cannot regulate 
the conduct governed by the noneconomic prong of § 2423(c) on the 
grounds of any aggregate effect: “We accordingly reject the argument 
that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based 
solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”156
Justice Clarence Thomas supported this rejection in a more recent 
decision, claiming that “Congress may not regulate noneconomic 
activity, such as sex crimes, based on the effect it might have 
on . . . commerce.”157 While these quotes certainly help the side arguing 
for the unconstitutionality of the PROTECT Act, the first is outdated and 
the second is a nonbinding dissent. The most recent relevant language,
from Gonzales v. Raich, would indicate that Congress can in fact regulate 
such activity: “In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause . . . [w]e need not determine whether respondents’
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce 
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”158
The Al-Maliki court’s ideas suggest that Congress has outstripped its 
Foreign Commerce Clause power in its enactment of, at the very least,
the noncommercial prong of § 2423(c). Moreover, the Al-Maliki court 
also adhered to these judicial musings, both holding and dicta, when it 
asserted that “Congress’s failure to even try to show the aggregate effect 
of noncommercial sexual activity on foreign commerce highlights its lack 
of power here.”159 However, this opinion finds itself at odds with the 
Court in Lopez, which posits that “Congress normally is not required to 
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on 
interstate commerce.”160 Considering that Congress’s Foreign Commerce 
Clause has a broader power than its interstate power, Congress should not 
need legislative findings to enact a statute with extraterritorial reach if it 
does not need those findings in the domestic arena. 
The Al-Maliki court continues to suggest that because the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c) does not regulate the channels of 
commerce, people in commerce, or activities that substantially affect 
commerce, it seems to regulate any conduct that occurs after lawful travel 
in foreign commerce has ended.161 As a result, the court perceived this 
                                                                                                                     
155. See id.
156. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
157. United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2512 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 557 (1995)).
159. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 793.
160. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
161. See Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 792.
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statute as having the effect of giving Congress an international police 
power. Indeed, the Al-Maliki court indicated, as an example, that Ohio 
has a statute punishing illicit sexual conduct with a minor because the 
state government has a “general police power,”162 but “[t]here isn’t—and 
can’t be—a generalized federal crime for traveling in interstate 
commerce with no illicit purpose and then, after a few months, 
committing illicit sexual conduct with a minor.”163 The federal 
government does not have a general police power. However, at this point, 
proponents of § 2423(c) will argue—and the author agrees—that
Congress has broader power in regulating commercial conduct in foreign 
countries than it does domestically. While undebatable, that fact does not 
allow for an unbridled reading or application of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, which would grant the federal government the power to “intrude 
on the sovereignty of other nations—just as a broad reading of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause allows it to intrude on the sovereignty of the 
States.”164 Using a rational basis standard would put a reasonable check 
on Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power, yet would still allow 
the power its greatest possible breadth, as courts would not need to have 
a rational basis to conclude a substantial effect exists (as they do in the 
domestic context), but just that some effect exists. 
The most recent decision regarding this issue comes from the Fourth 
Circuit in United States v. Bollinger.165 In this case, an ordained Lutheran 
minister travelled to Haiti, in 2004, to oversee a large ministry there.166
Five years later, in 2009, Bollinger began “molesting young girls.”167 In 
2012, a grand jury indicted Bollinger and charged him under the 
noncommercial prong of § 2423(c).168 Naturally, Bollinger challenged 
the constitutionality of § 2423(c).169 The Fourth Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute.170
This court made two major propositions relevant to this Note. First, 
the court concluded that the Foreign Commerce Clause demands its own 
interpretative framework.171 While this Note agrees that none of the tests 
or approaches the lower courts have taken are acceptable, it argues not 
for a new framework, but for a simplification of the approach to this and 
                                                                                                                     
162. Id. at 793 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (West 2015)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 798 F.3d 201, 207 (4th Cir. 2015).
166. Id. at 203.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 204–05.
169. Id. at 205.
170. Id. at 208.
171. Id. at 211.
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similar issues, which it will propose later.172 Second, the Bollinger court 
created and applied a new test—the demonstrable effects test173—distinct 
from the common “tenable nexus” test discussed above.174 Much like the 
other lower courts applying the tenable nexus test rather than using the
Lopez framework,175 the court in Bollinger subscribed to the opinion that 
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power exceeds that of its Interstate 
Commerce Clause power.176 Because of this, the court reasoned that the
third category in Lopez—activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce—“is unduly demanding in the foreign context.”177 This led the 
court to establish its own test: “the Foreign Commerce clause allows 
Congress to regulate activities that demonstrably affect . . . commerce.”178
The demonstrable effects test represents a unique but ambiguous 
divergence from the tenable nexus test. Much like the tenable nexus test, 
the demonstrable effects test lacks sufficient definition and explanation. 
However, the demonstrable effects test, compared with the tenable nexus 
test, appears to reign in Congress’s power. While the term “tenable”
implies that the court does not have to explicitly prove an activity’s
connection to foreign commerce, the term “demonstrable” denotes that 
the court must exhibit its capacity to prove or articulate an activity’s
evident effect on foreign commerce. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines “demonstrable” as “capable of being shown or made evident” or
as something that is “readily apparent.”179 Unfortunately, that analysis 
belongs only to this Note, and not to the Bollinger court, which held that
a showing of demonstrable effect demands only that “the effect be more 
than merely imaginable or hypothetical.”180 The court’s explanation of 
the test, therefore, does not parallel the word it chose. Although this 
language does not serve to create a test with much exactness, it might 
have the effect—if read in the same manner this Note reads it—of
temporarily acting as a narrower test than the tenable nexus approach.
In reaching its conclusion that the regulated activity must have a 
demonstrable effect on foreign commerce, the court took a few liberties. 
While attempting to discern how directly an activity must affect foreign 
commerce before Congress may regulate it, the court indicated—like 
                                                                                                                     
172. See infra Part V.
173. Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 215–16.
174. See supra Section III.B.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2006).
176. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 211 (holding that “the power to regulate commerce . . . when 
exercised in respect of foreign commerce may be broader than when exercised as to interstate 
commerce” (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932)).
177. Id. at 215.
178. Id. at 215–16.
179. Demonstrable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014).
180. Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 216.
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many other courts181—that Congress’s power is broader in the foreign 
context.182 For support, however, the court cited National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, “noting that Congress’s interstate 
power must be ‘read carefully to avoid creating a general federal 
authority akin to the police power.’”183 This misrepresents the Sebelius 
Court’s actual assertion. The Sebelius Court did not specifically say that 
the interstate power must be read carefully, but referred rather to the 
entire Commerce Clause power as a whole, including the regulation of 
Commerce “with foreign [n]ations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”184 It seems as though the Bollinger court 
intentionally placed the Sebelius Court’s suggestion of “read[ing] 
carefully” in the much narrower context of just the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, rather than the Commerce Clause as a whole, for the purpose of 
illustrating the difference in breadth of power between the Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce clauses.185 This implies that courts need not read the 
Foreign Commerce Clause carefully, which this Note would caution 
against; while Congress has greater power in the foreign arena, courts 
must still read the Clause carefully lest it ignore the outer limits to which 
the Clause is subject.186 Although Foreign Commerce Clause analysis 
eliminates state sovereignty concerns, this Note encourages a careful 
reading of the Foreign Clause to prevent intruding upon the sovereignty 
of other nations, as prior case law has warned against.187
Moreover, the court seemingly failed to meet the requirements of its 
own test. The court stated that “[i]t is eminently rational to believe that 
prohibiting the non-commercial sexual abuse of children by Americans 
abroad has a demonstrable effect on sex tourism and the commercial sex 
industry.”188 But rather than articulating how this brand of 
noncommercial conduct can demonstrably affect sex tourism or the 
commercial sex industry, the court—much like the court in Pendleton—
focused on why the legislation was enacted. In fact, the court quoted the 
same language as the Pendleton court, detailing the need for the 
legislation to “close significant loopholes.”189 The court also indicated
                                                                                                                     
181. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979); Pac. 
Seafarers, Inc. v. Pac. Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Bulova Watch Co. 
v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1952). 
182. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 211.
183. Id. (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012)).
184. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
185. Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 212 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578).
186. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995).
187. United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 793 (2015).
188. Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 218.
189. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 2–3 (2002)). “Many developing countries have 
fallen prey to the serious problem of international sex tourism. . . . Because poor countries are 
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that the “international community has suggested the need for a ‘holistic 
approach’ to combat forms of commercial sexual exploitation like child 
prostitution and child pornography.”190
Showing legislative intent—however admirable—does not exhibit a 
demonstrable effect. But the court did attempt to show a demonstrable 
effect: it subscribed to the assertion of the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Texas that “there is a rational basis for concluding 
that leaving non-commercial sex with minors outside of federal control 
could affect the price of child prostitution services and other market 
conditions in the child prostitution industry.”191 This does not 
demonstrably prove or give evidence for the § 2423(c) noncommercial 
prong’s effect on commerce, let alone commerce with a foreign nation. 
The court’s use of the word “could” indicates that the court is 
hypothesizing. Ironically, by using this language as its only indication of 
the degree to which Bollinger’s conduct has any effect on commerce, the 
court contradicted its own requirement that showing a demonstrable 
effect on commerce requires “the effect be more than merely imaginable 
or hypothetical.”192
The belief that “regulating the non-commercial sexual abuse of 
minors would strengthen the regulation of commercial sexual abuse” is
just that: a belief.193 But finding a rational basis to conclude that 
regulating the noncommercial conduct could have an effect on a larger 
regulatory scheme, much like in Raich,194 should allow Congress to 
prohibit the conduct. Perhaps if the court had legislative findings 
regarding a real effect rather than a hypothetical one, this court would 
have met its own test. However, without that, this conduct would appear 
to meet only a rational basis test, as the court made no argument beyond 
a hypothetical, which is too attenuated to qualify as demonstrable. The 
court’s only remaining rationale for upholding the constitutionality of 
§ 2423(c) was legislative intent, which does not equate to Congress’s
power to regulate the conduct at issue.
                                                                                                                     
often under economic pressure to develop tourism, those governments turn a blind eye toward this 
devastating problem because of the income it produces.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 
2–3).
190. Id. at 218.
191. Id. at 219 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 
807–08 (W.D. Tex. 2009)).
192. Id. at 216.
193. Id. at 219 (citing United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2010)).
194. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
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IV. THE NONCOMMERCIAL PRONG OF § 2423(C) IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Depending on which test a court uses, the noncommercial prong of 
§ 2423(c) might be constitutional. Certainly, an application of the tenable 
nexus test might make it appear constitutional. But what about the 
demonstrable effects test from Bollinger? While the Bollinger court 
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, it did not meet its own test.195
Without legislative findings, the noncommercial prong falls short of 
meeting the requirements of the demonstrable effects test, despite the 
court’s holding. While Congress is not normally required to make formal 
legislative findings, such findings alone might be sufficient to uphold the 
constitutionality of the statute under the demonstrable effects test.196
However, the court’s articulation of the demonstrable effects test is 
unduly demanding in the foreign context. 
That being said, the Bollinger court, for all its shortcomings, was 
certainly on the right track. Had the court chosen a word other than 
“demonstrable” and made an effort to clarify the test’s objectives and 
criteria, this Note might argue the complete validity of the court’s
disposition. Although it did not meet its own test, the court used
appropriate reasoning. The court’s rationale—that not regulating the 
noncommercial conduct could in fact have an effect on commerce197—
differentiated itself from the other courts in the split. Most other courts 
focused on linking the travel—which they considered to be the sole 
economic activity—to the conduct,198 or focused on Congress’s
legislative intent.199 But the issue is not necessarily whether commercial 
travel can bring noncommercial conduct under Foreign Commerce 
Clause power, but whether the noncommercial conduct could in fact 
affect commercial activity—in this case, the commercial child sex trade 
and foreign child sex tourism. This Note contends that there is a rational 
basis for concluding that non-regulation of the noncommercial activity 
could affect commerce. 
While the noncommercial illicit sex act has no economic component, 
some scholars argue that, “as part of a larger regulatory scheme,” these 
noncommercial acts do substantially affect foreign commerce.200 This 
                                                                                                                     
195. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 203 (upholding the statute’s constitutionality based on 
Congress’s Foreign Commerce Clause power).
196. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
197. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 219.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting) (focusing on the requirement of the travel and the criminal act sharing a rational or 
tenable nexus).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2011).
200. E.g., Christine L. Hogan, Note, Touring Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: The 
Constitutionality of Prosecuting Non-Commercial Sexually Illicit Acts Under 18 U.S.C. 
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regulatory scheme language comes from Raich,201 which is—in some 
respects—quite analogous to Bollinger.202 The noneconomic activity in 
question in Morrison,203 on the other hand, is not analogous because that 
activity could not have an aggregate effect on commerce and was not part 
of a “larger regulatory scheme.”204
In Raich, the Court examined the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA),205 which criminalized the manufacture, distribution, and 
possession of controlled substances—in this case, marijuana.206 The 
Court then decided that “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity 
that is not itself ‘commercial’ . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate 
that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate 
market in that commodity.”207 The Court’s rational basis to conclude that 
the possession of small amounts of marijuana could aggregately affect 
the black market208 is analogous to the Bollinger court’s line of reasoning
that not regulating the noncommercial activity could have an effect on 
the related commercial activity.209 Following that rationale, this Note 
argues that by subjecting these cases to a rational basis standard, courts 
will correctly find § 2423 constitutional. 
In any event, the lower courts are in disarray, and they require 
guidance independent from the Lopez framework. Because the Supreme 
Court has yet to discuss the Foreign Commerce Clause in this context, or 
in a similar depth as the Interstate Commerce Clause, it has had no chance 
to “articulate the constitutional boundaries beyond which Congress may 
not pass in regulating the conduct of citizens abroad.”210 This has created 
a slippery slope. Additional need for an independent framework is 
evident considering the Supreme Court’s distinct treatment of the Indian 
                                                                                                                     
§ 2423(C), 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 641, 657 (2007) (discussing child sex tourism as a widespread 
economic crisis). 
201. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
202. In both cases, the courts analyze noneconomic activities and discuss how they, in 
aggregate, could affect commerce. Compare Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 (finding an aggregate effect 
on a larger regulatory scheme involving personal possession of marijuana), with Bollinger, 798 
F.3d at 219 (positing that the non-regulation of noneconomic activity could have a substantial 
effect on the large regulatory scheme involving international child sex trading).
203. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
204. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
205. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 
(2012)).
206. Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
207. Id. at 18.
208. See id. at 18–19 (comparing the facts of Raich to Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942), and stating, “[h]ere too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-
consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions”).
209. See United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 219 (4th Cir. 2015).
210. Id. at 209.
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Commerce clause.211 The Supreme Court has also determined that it “is 
also well established that the Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses 
have very different applications,” implying that it is inappropriate to 
apply the commerce clause doctrine developed in the context of 
commerce “among” States to trade “with” Indian tribes.212 However, this 
Note argues that rather than creating or using a new framework, the Court 
should turn to a fundamental judicial standard of review and analyze 
Foreign Commerce Clause cases using a rational basis standard. 
The Court’s application of its lowest standard of review, the rational 
basis test, will provide it with sufficient latitude to address foreign 
commerce issues. Allowing regulation of activities that do not reach the 
level of substantially affecting commerce—which the Interstate
Commerce Clause would require for regulation—gives Congress and the 
courts more expansive power to regulate foreign commerce consistent 
with both Foreign Commerce Clause case law and legislative intent.
Additionally, applying the rational basis standard will inhibit courts from 
permitting any irrational regulation of foreign conduct. For example, one 
current concern with § 2423(c) is that its only hook into foreign 
commerce is international travel; a rational basis standard would 
proscribe the irrational punishment of a U.S. citizen for travelling to Paris 
and giving the jacket on her back to a homeless person; no court would 
have a rational basis to conclude that such conduct would have any type 
of effect on commerce or a larger regulatory scheme.
V. RATIONAL BASIS: THE ONLY RATIONAL SOLUTION
Rather than creating its own framework, this Note suggests that bereft 
of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have overcomplicated their 
analyses of Foreign Commerce Clause issues. As rational basis is the
Court’s lowest standard of review, Congress’s power to regulate 
commerce is at its greatest when making determinations through a 
rational basis lens. If a law does not meet rational basis, then it is 
irrational. As such, because Congress’s Commerce Clause power is 
greater in the foreign context than in the interstate context, it should use 
the tool that allows it to bring the most conduct under its scope in 
accordance with the Constitution. That tool is rational basis. 
The tests the lower courts created convolute analysis and muddle these 
rarely navigated Foreign Commerce Clause waters. The tenable nexus 
test is simply an ambiguously defined reiteration of the rational basis test. 
But why create new language when it will certainly complicate future
analysis? Courts will then have multiple tests, some of which accomplish 
                                                                                                                     
211. Id. at 211.
212. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
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the same result. Moreover, the demonstrable effects test will similarly 
perplex courts. While the Bollinger court’s rationale fits neatly into a 
rational basis approach,213 its explanation of its test indicates that it 
requires some sort of proof or legislative findings; however, the Court 
does not even require such proof or findings in the Interstate Commerce 
Clause domain, and therefore that requirement is unduly demanding in 
the foreign arena, where Congress’s power is greater. Much like the Clark
court—and the courts that subsequently utilized the tenable nexus test—
the Bollinger court gives a vague and terse definition of its test.214 Neither 
of these tests will be helpful for future analyses and will most likely 
overcomplicate issues, shift focus on to the wrong concepts, and inundate 
courts with an unnecessary number of analytical options to choose from, 
which will have a negative impact on the judiciary’s ability to speak with 
“one voice” on Foreign Commerce Clause issues.
Some scholars suggest additional frameworks. This Note disagrees 
with creating a new framework and argues for a simple rational basis 
approach. For example, Professor Goodno suggests a four-factor test for 
this issue: “(1) impact on the United States; (2) territorial nexus; (3) 
congressional intent; and (4) respect for international norms.”215 While 
this Note does not give an in-depth analysis of this four-factor test, it does
provide a brief explanation of its disagreement with it. First, this test 
appears to be more complex than any test the courts have for interpreting 
and analyzing Foreign Commerce Clause cases. Considering its broad 
power in this arena, the court should not have to meet more standards. 
More important for the scope of this Note is that congressional intent 
should not play a main role in determining whether Congress has the 
power to regulate some particular activity. Intent does not equal power. 
Too many lower courts have misinterpreted the issue at hand, or have 
used legislative intent to indicate why Congress enacted § 2423(c) rather 
than how it has to power to do so.216 Legislative intent, it appears, has 
only served to point courts in the wrong direction in this case.
The language and multiplicity of the factors in this test will serve, 
much like the additional tests that lower courts have created, to further 
complicate the already overly convoluted Foreign Commerce Clause 
field. Finally, courts should not use the tri-category framework from 
Lopez because it is too demanding for the foreign context; for example, 
courts should not have to have a rational basis to conclude that an activity 
substantially affects commerce, just that it has some effect on commerce. 
Determining the degree to which the activity affects commerce rests 
                                                                                                                     
213. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 219.
214. See id. at 216 (“Requiring a showing of demonstrable effect, of course, still requires 
that the effect be more than merely imaginable or hypothetical.”).
215. Goodno, supra note 11, at 1204.
216. See supra Section III.C.
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outside the scope of this Note. However, it stands to reason that because
the Foreign Commerce Clause power is greater than the Interstate
Commerce Clause power, the activity should not have to have so great an 
effect to fall under Congress’s power.
CONCLUSION
The fact that some U.S. citizens have made a habit out of exploiting 
other nations’ lax or nonexistent governmental standards or, in the case 
of Bollinger, feel beyond reproach and the reach of law, creates a great 
need for legislation to curtail such behavior. If the Court adopts the 
rational basis standard in the Foreign Commerce Clause setting, as this 
Note proposes, it will find the current legislation, § 2423(c), 
constitutional as there is a rational basis to conclude that not regulating 
the illicit sex at issue could have an effect on a larger regulatory scheme. 
On the other hand, if the Court adopted a more stringent standard 
requiring it to meet various elements or make certain findings, this could 
lead to impermissibly and arbitrarily limiting the power of the Foreign 
Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court should push the new standards 
created by lower courts to the wayside and return to Constitutional Law 
standard of review basics: it should apply a rational basis standard to 
make determinations about Foreign Commerce Clause cases.
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